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CHAPTER I
•

INTRODUCTION

f'

..
..

That science has become one of the gods of our era goes
without saying, and that it has caused problems for belief in
the God or· traditional Christianity 1s similarly apparent. · Our
schoolchildren can testify to what Mr. Frederick Ferr~ states
more sophisticatedly:
/The7 appeal to scientific attitude.a as providing
the-model of good thinking 1s very pervasive, and
with reason. Just as scientific achievements have
transformed the world we live in, so scientific
methods of thinking have fundamentally influenced
the ways we think--or acknowledge that we ought to
think. The appeal to scientific method as the paradigm of responsible thinking is not only pervasive,
therefore; it is also highly persuasive. It would
be absurd to ignore man-ts most obviously successful
instrument for understanding and controlling reality.
The mind of the world--the secular mind--is rightly
impressed with the critical rigor of empirical science. If this makes for difficulties in ooftinuing
to use language about "God," then so be it.
However, it is by no means clear that such difficulties
need exist if our theology and our philosophy of science are
sophisticated and sensitive enough,_ and it is the aim of this
brief research report to examine the thought of one prominent
modem philosopher who has specialized in the philosophy of
science and who.!:?!! purell philosophical 5rounds has concluded
that no antagonism must necessarily exist between science and
religion.
The five major works of Stephen Edelston Toulmin, 2 currently professor of philosophy at Brandeis University, that

2

will be treated in this paper are "Contemporary Scientific
•

•

Mythology,"J An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics, 4

- ------ - -- --- - --- - ---

Foresight and Understanding,5 The Philosophy£! Science,6 and
The Uses£! Argument.?

It will be my· object to set forth the

essentials of Toulm1n's thought concerning first science and
secondly extra-scientific endeavors, especially theology; to
relate some of Mr. Toulm1n~s conclusions to those of two prominent exponents of "ordinary language" philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle; and finally to look at the work of
a _few theologians, especially Schubert M. Ogden, who have attempted to dialog with and build upon thinkers such as Toulmin,
Wittgenstein, and Ryle.
The few conclusions that such a short study allqw one to
make are along the following lines:

science and religion do

different jobs, different complementary and _not contradictory
jobs.

Religious thought deals basically in personal1st1c,

·self-involvlng11 (a phrase used by Donald D. Evans 8 ) terms,

11

whereas· science does not, and these different jobs and interests
are reflected in their different logical structures and approaches to problems. · In short, there is room·in the universe
for both science and theology, and to know this is to enhance
both our scientific and theological reflections.

CHAPTER II
•

.

THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE

•

Webster defines "logic" as, among other things,

11

the

sys-

tem or principles of reasoning applicable to any branch of
knowledge or study. 111

It 1s to this kind of definition of

logic that Toulmin addresses himself in a crucial passage in
the Ethics:
An examination of the situations in which one first
looks for a 11 scient1fio explanation", and of the function of the explanation 1n these situations, can
give one, therefore, an understanding of the _lo~ic
of science. In talking of "logic" I am here including both
(i) the tests to be applied to a "scientific
explanation" before one decides whether to accept
it as 11 correct", reject it as "incorrect", or suspend Judgement upon it, and
(11) the limits to be placed on the scope of
science, from which one is to decide when something that looks like a "scientific" assertion or
question has become either nonsensical or nonscientific.2
This passage is .c rucial because 1 t is echoed throughout Toulmin• s
writings and may be · oonsidered to be one of his basic theses.3
r:would like to use it as an outline to summarize his thinking
about science, answering four questions:

(1) in what kinds

of situations do we look for a "scientific explanation"; (2}
what is "the function of the explanation in these situations";
(J) what kinds of tests may be applied to scientific explana-

tions; (4) what "limits

fa.r!.7

to be placed on the scope of·

science."
(1)

The first question that must be asked, then, is what

4

is the Sitz im Leben of science?

------·

•

What kinds of occurrences

or circumstances cause us to ask scientific questions?

How

does science fit into the ordinary affairs of man?

..

It is interesting that here (and therefore in #2 below)
a shift in Toulmin's thought occurs, a shift from a more to a
less utilitarian-type position.

In Ethics (and implied in PS)

Toulmin maintains that science arises from situations 1n which
the unexpected occurs:

a person expects one thing but is sur-

prised when another occurs instead, e.g., .one would expect a
stick to look straight when placed into some water (since it
looks straight everywhere else), but instead it looks bent.
Although in some circumstances of our lives it is wise to "expect the unexpected," and this may often be enjoyable, nonetheless most of the time we would like to know what to expect.
How can we-get the future in line with the past and the present
is the question we ask. 4
Whereas the early Toulmin was concerned with situations
in which we ask the rather utilitarian q~estion "how can we
turn the unpredictable into the predictable," the later Toulmin
would argue that science. arises in those situations in which we
ask the question "how can we relate
accepted'?"S

·! the-.- ancunail.ous · to ··,the

The above account was too crude, for it failed to

take into consideration the fact that many times a person can
· predict an occurrence, yet fail to explain it.

E.g., the

Babylonians could predict astronomical phenomena better than
.

.

the Greeks could, yet we of the West maintain that the Greeks

5
11

•

understood, 11 could explain astronomical phenomena whereas the

Babylonians could not.

Science still deals with situations in

which the "unexpected" occurs, but ·11 unexpected" is not synonymous with "unpredictable" but with

11

anomalous, 11 for I may be

able to predict something with utmost precision and still be
baffled by it. 6
(2)

It follows that Toulmin gives two different accounts
.

as to how scientific explanations function in these situations,
for the situations themselves are assessed differently.

The

first account 1s that scientific explanations serve "to bring
our past experience to bear upon our present and future expectat"ions, in such a way as to •save appearances• and turn the
unexpected, as far as po~sible, into the expected. 11 7 E.g., a
scientific theory may show us other situations 1n which refraction occurs and why, because of the nature of light, it must
occur, so that we will always expect a stick to look bent.
But if we maintain that scientific explanations are to
"relate the anomalous to the accepted," then
the central aims of science • • • lie in the field of
intellectual creation: other activities--dianostic,
classificatory, industrial, or predict1ve--are
properly called 11 sc1ent1f1c 11 from their connection
with the explanatory 1dea8 and ideals which are the
heart of natural science.
(Toulmin's italics)
.....

\'1hat is

11

anomalous 11 and what is "accepted" introduces the im-

portant aspect of history into the discussion, for these change.
At one time 1n history it 1s "natural" for planets to travel
in straight lines, at another t1IQ.e it 1s "natural" for them

6

to travel in circles, at still another time it is "natural"
•
...

•

for them to move in ellipses.

Different disciplines and dif-

ferent epochs accept different "paradigms" or '~ ·1 deals:;of· ,natural
order" which mark off "natural" from

11

unnatural 11 phenomena,9

mark off the "anomalous" from the "accepted."

It is the func-

tion of scientific explanations to explain anomalous phenomena
either by comparing them with other, more selfexplanatory happenings of the same kind or by relating them to happenings of some other sort, which
are thought to be intrinsically more natural, acceptable, and self-explanatory.lo
.

(3)

As may have been expected from the above account of

the nature of scientific situations, the tests to be applied
to a scientific explanation are not as simple and straightforward as we commonly imagine.

There are different kinds of

scientific assertions, and they are verified in different kinds
of ways.

Since this 1s a much debated issue currently, I would

like to spend some time with Toulmin's views on the matter.
It is 1mport~nt, firstly, to note a basic distinctio.n
Toulmin draws between two kinds of sciences: "descriptive" and
"explanatory11 sciences • 11 These two kinds of soient1f1-c activities make t1ro kinds of st·a tements:

the former makes what

he terms "habit-statements" and the latter "nature-statements."
The habit-statements of the descriptive sciences are clear,
straightforward, and follow the traditional rules of deductive
logic.

E.g., the natural historian's job 1s to tell us how

many kinds of cats there are and what cats do; he takes the
classifications of our·everyday speech (he may subdivide them

7
and add a Latin name, but this is superficial), identify the
animal , and study and enumerate its habits .

Theories in this

kind of soience . (if they may be called theories at all ) depend
for their verification (if we may speak of verification at all)
on the weight and number of observations .

The more the observa-

tions the better the substantiation.
The nature- statements of the explanatory sciences , on the
other hand , are iouch more complex and do not follo1,i- the tradi tional rules of deductive logic .

!hen light waves 1·1ere dis-

covered , it was not as 1f another kind of cat had been discovered ,
but ~:hat 1ras discovered as "a fresh t·tay of drawing inferences
about optical phenomena , 1112 a "representational device . 111 3

he

nature- statements of the explanatory sciences do not follow the
traditional rules of deductive logic because it is the object
of these sciences to discover"~ methods of representation
f_model~,.7 , and so of

~

techniques by which inferences can

be drawn--and drawn in 1·rays which fit the facts" (my 1talics) 14
( to infer , for example , what the length of the shadot: will be
that ls cast by a six foot wal l at an angle of

JO

degrees) .

In other words , the explanatory scientists are not mere
collectors and summarizers of observations :

........._

Indeed , the inferences of physics are sub~tantial
Just because they !!'.!: .:!£ ~ .!!!2!:! .!h!!'.!.. transformations of our observation- reports . If one has counted
'overail As and checked that they are all Bs , one
has thereby checked that any particular A one selects
1-1111 be a B: subsequent inferences from "All As
are Bs 11 to 11 Th1s A is a B11 are automatic . On the
other hand, if one has measured the height of a
wall and the angle of elevation of the sun, one

..

8

has not thereby measured the depth of the shadow cast by the wall; yet this is something which
the techniques of geometrical optics enable one ·. ·.
to infer, providing the circumstances are of a
kind in which physicists have found the techniques
reliable.15 (my italics)

•

•

After one has carefully distinguished between the two
basic kinds of sciences, two further distinctions are necessary:

(a) one among different levels of an explanatory science,

say physics; (b) one among different explanatory sciences, between say physics and biology.
to keep in mind the

0

It is ·e ssential, Toulmin asserts,

strat1f1ed 11 nature of an explanatory sci-

ence,16 its "conceptual scaffolding. 111 7 All statements in a
science do not have the same logical status, and therefore are
to be ve·rified in logically .different ways.

E.g., the science

of geometrical optics 1s based on the Principle of Rectilinear
Propagation, and Mr. Frederick Ferr~ says in capsule form what

science's basic principles will be in the success of the science
Toulmin says at length:

as a whole. 1118

-

"The vindication /verification? of a

In other words, the only way one. can "disprove"

the Principle of Rectilinear Propagation would be to show that
there is no need, no use for the entire science of geometrical
optics in our everyday lives.

To do away with this principle

would be to render all the theories and laws of geometrical
optics meaningless, because they a~l assume and are based on
it.
As for the theories and laws that assume such a principle,
there are a number of tests that scientists apply.

Of two

9

competing theories scientists ask which of the two is more
•

•

•

predictively reliable, which is more coherent (fi~s in better
with the theories established in adjacent fields of study),
which is more convenient (gives the better results with less
effort on the scientist's part), 1 9 and many others -still.
I have deliberately emphasized the creative, non-experimental
side of science only because Toulmin does, but a further word
is necessary about the role of observation and experimentation
in the explanatory sciences.

In short, experimentation and

observation det.e rmine how far a theoretical model (e.g., light
travels in straight lines) may be "deployed"; over what range

~-

of circumstances i't will help us to draw inferences.

"Truth"

versus "falsity" is not the basic issue, but rather:

will a

certain model or theory fit under certain circumstances.

If

observation and experimentation show that its use must be
limited or that some of the techniques it implies must be supplemented, that still does not do away with its value in the
wide region 1n which it 1s applicable.

This leads Mr. Toulmin

to make some rather bold statements:
Suppose one says that laws of nature are not true,
false, or probable; that these terms are indeed
not even applicable to them; and that scientists
are accordingly not interested in the question of
the "truth" of laws of nature--all of which might
fairly be said: one does not thereby deny the
obvious, namely, that scientists seek for the truth.
One points out, rather, that the abstract noun
"truth" 1s wider in its application than the adjective 11 true", that different types of statements
need to be logically assessed in different terms,
and that not every class of statement in which a
scientist deals need be such as can be spoken of

10

•
t

..
•

as 11 true 11 / 11 false 11 / 11 probable 11 • This, of all
things, is most often overlooked in the logical
discussion of the physical sciences: it 1s therefore essential to insist on 1t. Saying a law holds
un1versally_is not the same as saying that it is
true always and not only on certain conditions •
The logical opposition "holds 11 / 11 does not hold" is
as fundamental as the opposition "true 11 / 11 untrue 11 ,
and cannot be resolved into it.20
Observation and experimentation deal with the verification of
only one logical type of scientific statement. 21
In distinguishing between different kinds of explanatory
sciences one also finds the absence of an unambiguous verificational ·apparatus.

E·;g., on·.: one occasion a theoretical

astronomer may make use of a non-Euclidean geometry and adopt
light-rays as the standard of straightness, while on another
occasion he may find it more convenient to use Euclidean geometry :-and ··;_speak of light-rays as being deflected.
he has contradicted himself:

Technically,

in the first case light-rays can

never be anything but straight (because they are the standard
of straightness), but in the second they are bent.

However,

actually he is not contradicting himself, because,:-as Toulmin
remarks in a different but similar context,

•

In the case of word-games, as of descriptions, the
nature of the logical criteria we are to apply 1s
best understood from a study of the activity--and
especially the point of the .a cti! ty--of which
the type of speech forms a part.

2

Euclidean and non-Euclidean sciences are put to different uses
within the wider context of theoretical physics, and hence
there is no contradiction between them, no need to attempt to
verify which geometry 1s true and which 1s false.

11

Also, as noted above (pg. 6), different disciplines accept
•

different "paradigms" or "ideals of natural order" which mark
off "natural" from

..

11

unnatural 11 phenomena, which leads to a

situation in which these disciplines
have really no common theoretical terms in which
to discuss their problems fruitfully. They will
not even have the same problem: events which are
11 phenomenaii in one man's eyes will b~":lpassed over
by the other as "perfectly natural". J
The different sciences have different jobs to do and, therefore. different problems.

A musicologist does not explain

the Choral Symphony by referring to atoms or neurons.

(4)

This matter of relating different kinds of scientific

activities leads conveniently into the discussion of relating
scientific activity as a whole to other kinds of activities,
or, in other words, the question of the limits of science.

A

statement .o f the limits of science is implicit in the above

-- - ---

discussions concerning the Sitz im Leben of science, the funotion of scientific explanations, and the manner in which they
are verified:

when a statement that looks like a scientific

assertion does not attempt to relate anomalous to accepted
phenomena and cannot be "verified" in one of the several ways
•

that scientific statements are (i.e. appropriate to its logical
level), then such a statement is either (a) nonsensical· or
(b) non-scientiflc. 24
An example of a nonsensical statement would be one that

-

would attempt in scientific terms to justify all scientific
explanations.

A scientist qua scientist can only decide where

12

a genuine decision is offered, i.e., where he can decide
...

between this or that scientific explanation.

But when someone

asks the question "can any scientific explanation be correct?"
•

..

the only genuine decision that can be made is between science
or no science.

------

The Sitz 1m Leben itself is being called into

question, and 1t could be scarcely possible that we are being
asked to stop relating anomalous to accepted phenomena, for we
could not do that if we tried.

If a scientist do~s give a

justification for science, then he is not doing so as a scientist, but as a man-in-the-street.
The converse of this, and an interesting .c onverse for a
theologian, is discussed by Toulmin in his essay "Contemporary
Scientific Mythology. 11

Not only must we not ·~pass •non-s.cien:bific
1

statements off as scientific ones, but we must also guard
against masquerading scientific statements as m~taphysical or
religious ones.

As soon as scientific terms and statements

are wrenched out of their close association with phenomena, as
soon as they cease to be qualified in the rigorous way that
the

11

conoeptual scaffolding" of a science requires, then they

lose the virtues and characteristics of what we know as science.
When two people appeal to the same scientific
theory as backing for different 11 world-views 11 ·or
different political doctri~es, how can we even set
about choosing between them? Within science, we
can at any rate prove our views in practice. But
when we put scientific terms to non-scientific
uses, this, the chief merit of a scientific approach, is lost. For all that experiment or observation c~n show, one scientific myth 1s as good
as another.::,

lJ
In my opinion Nr . 'Toulmin seems to concede tacitly the
need for myths , 26 but even if that is not the case, he clearly
caintains that once scientific statements are wrested from
their circumscribed contexts in scientific theory, they are
clearly no better than other myths .
be worse .

In fact, they riay often

He states :

We are inclined to suppose that myths must necessarily be anthropomorphic , and that personification is the unique road to myth. But this
assumption is baseless: the myths of the twentieth century • • • are not so much anthropomorphic
as mechanomorphic . And why , after all, should not
the purposes of myth be served as effectively by
nicturing the world in terms of mythical machines
as by invoking mythical personages?27
What is said here of religion may also apply to other fields :
scientific statements , by virtue of their Sitz im

~

and

the methods in i-1hich they are employed, must not be used as
aesthetic , ethical , or other kinds of statements .

11 • • • When

we use terms of a scientific origin in an extended manner, as
the vehicles of some more- than- scientific attitude to the world,
science is neutral between all conclusions . 1128

CHAPTER III
•

THE LOGICS OF OTHER FIELDS

.

The Logic of Ethics
Several .q uestions naturally arise at this juncture in an
analysis of Mr. Toulmin's thought:

since not all non-scientific

statements are nonsensical, since scientific statements should
not be made to do non-scientific jobs and vice versa, since
there are limits to scientific endeavor, what then 1s the status
of non-scientific statements?

What is the logical relationship

between scientific statements and non-scientific ones?
Toulmin investigates ethics along lines similar to those
he discussed 'in his analysis of science (see pg. J above).

He

states that he wants to indicate two things:
(1) the different types of question which naturally arise in ethical contexts, and the ways in which
they are answered; and
(11) the limits of ethical reasoning--that is,
the kinds of occasion on which ·q uestions and con!id.;.~_•
erations of an ethical kind can no longer arise.
Once again we are forced back to ordinary life:
context in which ethical reasoning arises?

..

or job in our common experience?

what is the

What is its role

Once this has been established~

we should be able to discern good ethical reasoning from bad.

---

Ethical reasoning 1s to be found in a different Sitz 1m
Leben from that of scientific reasoning.

Ethics is distinctly

social, and for once in his writings Toulmin gives us a fairly
pithy definition.

Ethics is

11

a part of the process trhereby the

15
desires and actions of the members of a community are har•
,

.

•

...

monised."

Correspondingly, the function of ethical reasoning

in this kind of situation is

11

to correlate our feelings and

behaviour in such a way as to make the fulfilment of everyone's
aims and desires as far as possible compatible. 112
There are many similarities between scientific and ethical
reasoning--the logics of science and ethics correspond in
several ways.

Like science ethics endeavors to establish prin--

ciples which can stand on their own feet, which are independent
of person and occasion; different kinds of ethical questions
are answered•~in different ways (as different kinds of scientific questions are verified in different kinds of ways).3

Most

importantly, at least for this inquiry, there are limits to
ethical inquiry which are established in ways similar to the
ways in which one establishes the limits of scientific inquiry.4

One can ask an ethic1an to choose between ~his or that

-----as an ethician there is

ethical course or reason, but he cannot be asked as ·an eth1c1an
to justify all ethical explanations:
no choice open to him.

When someone asks the question

11

can

any ethical explanation be correct?" the only genuine deeision
that can be made is between ethics or no ethics, and the
ethician can give no better answer than the man-in-the-street.5
In a cogent passage that will bear on our discussion of the
function of theology, Toulmin states:
Ethics may be able to 11 justify 11 one of a number of
courses of·action, or one social practice as opposed
to another: -but it does not extend to the 11 just1f1cat1on 11

16
of all reasoning about conduct. One course of action can be opposed to another: one social practice can be opposed to another. But to what are
we expected to oppose 11 eth1cs-as-a-whole 11 ? There
can be no discussion about the proposition, "Ethics
is ethics"; any argument treating 11 eth1cs 11 as
something other than it is must be false; and, 1f
those who call for a 11 justifioation11 of ethics
want "the case for morality", as opposed to "the
case for expedience",- etc., then they are giving
philosophy a job which is not its own. To show
that you ought to choose certain actions is one
thing: to make you want;__to do. what you Qugh~ to
do is another, and not a philosopher's task.

•

But though there are important similarities between the
two fields, important and valid differences must not be obscured.

Because ethics has a different job to do from that

of science, it therefore does its job differently.

E.g.,

scientific theory cannot modify the experiences it explains:
a scientist may explain to us why a stick looks bent or a sunset red, but he cannot keep us from seeing the stick as bent

or

the sunset as red.

However, it is the very function of

ethical statements to change our experiences and emotions,
whereas it was the function of science to change only our expectations.

E.g., after a certain kind of ethical explana-

tion we:~·may not experience an action as bad as we once did or ·
we may see a certain attitude now as noble whereas before it
seemed to us to be base.?
More specifically. ethics must not be considered quasipsychology, nor must the .c onverse be entertained.

To say

that ethics is applied psychology is to ignore the crucial
facts that morality came much before there was any psychology

17
to be applied and, secondly, that there· are a great many good
"

..
•

people who know nothing about psychology and many psychologists
who are not always.the best of men. 8

Furthermore, it should

be pointed out ~hat a scientist, in order to be a scientist,
must specify what kind of material he is working with:

he must

select and arrange his material with the greatest care possible
so that he may obtain a ~haracteristic specimen in a reproducible situation.

Such, however, is not the case with an

ethician, who may be likened to an engineer in some respects,
for he can never, by definition, choose or arrange his material.
He 1s always presented with incompletely specified material in
an incompletely known situation.9

In summary, Toulmin states:

In so far as our psychology 1s imperfect, our
morality has to develop independently of it; and
their union remains an ideal towards which, like
tunnellers under the Alps, the moralist struggles
in one direction, the psychologist 1n another. 1 0
From his account of the nature and development of science in
general, I think it 1s fair to conclude that psychology, or
any other science for that matter, will never achieve "perfection," and therefore that the autonomy of ethics remains
assured. 11
'

The Logic of Logic
As the back cover states, Uses "extends into general.
philosophy lines of enquiry already sketched by Mr. Toulmin
in his earlier books on ethics and the philosophy of science."
It is a difficult work, bristling with many parochial logical

r

18

issues, but its main thrust is very significant for and directly
related by Toulmin to the question of the status of theological
reasoning.
•

The programmatic question that Toulmin seeks to answer,
and a very urgent one in view of the fact that we have established 1the autonomy of at least two fields . of 1n~u1ry, is the
following:
Are the differences between the standards we employ in different fields irreducible? Must the
things which, in practice, make a conclusion possible, probable, or certain--or an argument shaky,
strong or conolusive--vary as !e move from one
field of argument to another? 1
The question is answered by a criticism of the current state
and posture of logical theory and by the ·p ositing of an alternative.
As long as logic continues to operate with a mathematical
model, logical theory cannot do justice to the entire range of
human inquiry:

ethics, aesthetics, and theology (the last 1s
explicitly defended by Toulmin on several occas1ons 1 3) will

always seem like second-rate hiunan activities as long as logicians
choose this skewed model upon which to operate and get their
bearings.

We should choose, rather, a model which will not

a-priori degrade certain fields of inquiry.

Toulmin suggests

a jurisprudential analogy:
Logic (we may say) is generalised jurisprudence.
Arguments can be compared with law-suits, and the
claims we make and argue for in extra-legal contexts with claims made in the courts, while the
cases we present in making good· each kind of claim
can be compared with each other. A main task of

19
Jurisprudence is to characterise the essentials of
the legal process: the procedures by which claimsat-law·are put forward, disputed and determined,
and the categories in terms of which this is done.
Our own inquiry 1s a parallel one: we shall aim,
in a similar way, to characterise what may be
called 11 the rational process", the procedures and
categories by using which cla1ms~1n-general can
be argued for and settled.1~
Working with this analogy he draws a distinction between two
aspects of an argument whic~ have been obscured by logic's
holding to a mathematical model for its inquiry.

In every ar-

gument in every field of inquiry we must recognize both the
force of its terms and the criteria for their use.
11

force" of a term Toulmin means

its use:

11

By

the

the practical implications of

the force of the term 'cannot' includes, for instance,

the implied general injunction that something-or-.o ther has to
be ruled out in this-or-that way and ·for such-a-reason."

By

contrast, "criteria" are considered to be the "standard, grounds
and reasons, by reference to which we decide in any context that
the use of a particular • • • term is appropriate. 111 5
Once we accept this distinction it should be fairly clear
that our criteria are field-dependent (to use Toulmin's terminology), while the force of our arguments are field-invariant. 16
On the basis of logic alone there is nothing less logically
rigorous about, say, aesthetics because it does not use the
criteria of physics to decide between true and false aesthetic

•

proposition.

Aesthetics does decide between true and false · :·.:. :_.

statements (.e.g., this 1s a great painting"), and it does so
.,,

with the rigor appropriate to the varying aspects of its
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subJec~ matter.

But it does so on the basis of its own criteria:

Just because. it does not assess the Choral Symphony in terms
of electrons or neurons does not mean that aesthetic scholarship is any less perspicuous or acute or discriminatory.
Logic cannot tell or prescribe beforehand how a field of
inquiry should do its busines~:

how empirical would that bel

But, with its mathematical bias, this is precisely what logic
has attempted to do, and with predictably myopic results.
Logicians must be prepared to supply "not epistemological theorz
but epistemological analysis. 111 7

It must become truly empirical:

descriptive rather than prescriptive, and therefore also historical, for
To think up new and better methods of arguing in
any field is to make a major advance, not Just in
logic, but in the substantive field itself: great
logical innovations are part and parcel of great
scientific, moral, political or legal innovations.
In the natural sciences, for instance, men such _a s
Kepler, Newton, Lavoisier, Darwin and Freud have
transformed not only our beliefs, but also our ways
of arguing and our standards of relevance and proof:
they have accordingly enriched the ogic as well
as the content of natural science.

18

In conclusion Toulmin issues the following admonition:

•

_,

Broad similarities there may be between arguments
in different fields, both in the major phases of
the arguments • • • and in the micro-structure • • • :
it is our business, however, not to insist on
finding such resemblances at all costs, but to
keep an eye open quite as much for possible differences. Thus. in some fields we should expect
to find "necessary" conclusions as the rule, in
others mainly 11 presumptive 11 ones: in:ferences warranted by "laws 11 will have one structure, those
depending ·rather on simple empirical correlations
will be somewhat different. Where differences .o f
these kinds are found, we should n·o rmally respect
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•

...
-..

...

them; we are at liberty to try and think up new
and better ways of arguing in some field which ··.
specifically interests us; but we should beware
of concluding that there is any field in which all
arguments equally must be invalid. The temptation
to draw this conclusion should be taken as a dangersign: it indicates almost certainly that irrelevant canons of judgement have entered into our analysis, and that arguments in the field concerned are
being condemned for failing to achieve somethi~
which it is no business of theirs to achieve. 19
If:··there 1s one field in which a great many people have concluded that "all.arguments equally must be invalid" it is
theology, and I should like now to piece together what Mr.
Toulmin has to say about the status and function of the_ological
reasoning.
The Logic of Theology
Mr. Toulmin nowhere, to my knowledge, uses the phrase
"logic of theology," and as far as I am aware he discusses the
substance of theology only in two chapters of Ethics: (~Contemporary Scientific Mythology" being in the main an argument
against the over-extension of scientific terms and concepts).
But on the basis of what he says about other fields of inquiry,
I feel that we are justified in talking of the "logic of theology"
(indeed, it is ~lready a shibboleth in certain theological
circles), and although it would certainly be dangerous to extrapolate too extensively from.'.his :discussion of theology,
nonetheless his remarks on the subject, though few, are rather
clear and are in clear-enough opposition to those of other
philosophers 1n his same philosophical tradition.
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What establishes theology as a field worthy of investigation?

Characteristically Toulmin would direct us to the roots

of theology in the ordinary affairs of man, in the various sit•

uations and activities of human existence in the world.

Once

we have been so directed, it becomes fairly obvious that there
are some vexing questiong lying around in our analysis of scien·c e and ethics:

if scientists qua scientists cannot justify

science and if eth1c1ans qua ethicians cannot justify ethics,
if justifications of these fields cannot be supplied in the
terms and with the conceptual apparatus of these fields, can no
justifications be supplied?

Or are these questions merely

illusory?
No, such questions, "limiting questions" in Toulmin 1 s terminology, are not illusory; they are asked with too much insistence
. and persistence for that, and most frequently in four situations:
.( 1) When someone asks , "How do you explain

-

that?", of something which there 1s no question of
11 expla1ning", such as the deaths on their birthdays
of three children in one family.
( 11) \.,hen someone asks, 11 But which ought I to
do?", of t1fo courses of action between which, morally,
there is nothing to choose, and insists on an answer
independent of his personal preferences.
(111) When someone asks, not just "What reason
is there for accepting this explanation?"--meaning
11 th1s 11 one rather than 11 that 11 --but also, "What reason is there for accepting any scientific explanation?"
(iv) When someone asks, not just "Why ought I
to do th1s?"--mean1ng 11 th1s" course of action rather
than 11 that" one--but als~O 11 And why ought I to-do
anything that 1s right? 11
Although they resemble other kinds of questions in many different respects, nonetheless they are very different e·specially

\

in one regard:
•

they can never be answered conclusively as

can the questions of science or another field; they always
.s eem to point towards infinite regresses.

'

Such questions are

not flagrantly extra-rational like many fairy tale-like conundrums, but they certainly are peculiar, for they never seem to
satisfy a person. 21
Such "limiting questions" make up the stuff of religion,
the stuff (in Mr. Toulmin-~,s terminology) of faith.

They are

both eminently practical and eminently theoretical, for they
enable us to ~ccept situations which logically cannot admit of
a scientific explanation, to put our hearts into morality, to
accept scientific explanations, and to decide for or against
alternative courses of action with which ethics cannot help us,
(where there is no question of one course of action being more
socially beneficial than another).

Furthermore, lest this

sound overly much like a type of "God-of-the-gaps". strategy,
Toulmin notes (as does the noted philosopher of science Karl
Popper 22 ) that this a.p proach to religious belief along the
lines of limiting questions is highly positive, constructive,
and substantial.

•

Psychologically these questions provide us
with a sense of 11wonder 11 -· at =
.:the un1verse; 2 .3 they enable us to
"accept the world, just as the explanations of science help us
to understand it. 1124

Historically, religious quests have proven

to be the matrix for scientific quests, magic and primitive
religion being the progenitors of modern science.

At first,

all uncertainty about the future was uniform, but gradually

24
science evolved to provide man with a "special, separate, and
differentiated way of dealing with requests for exact knowJ

•

ledge.1125
This does not mean, however, that religion has been obviated in the process.

Toulmin argues:

Not only shall we continue to ask these ,Llimiti?l.67
questions, but we shall genuinely want answers to
them. And, of the answers which are given to us,
we shall regard some as being better than others.
Some, that 1s to say, will give us a reassurance
which will not be disappointed: will allay our
fear of "the eternity before and behind the brief
span" of our lives, and of 11 the infinite immensity"
of space; will provide comfort in the face of distress; and will answer our questions in a way which
will n~i seem in retrospect to have_missed their
point.
This may be taken tacitly to be Toulm1n's exposdtion of the
logic of theology, the standard by which one is to assess true
from false religious assertions, the emotive context in our
lives in which they find their use or job.

Once we have properly

delineated .the function of faith, there 1s no reason to logically
eliminate religion from the catalog of meaningful discourse.
In the arena of theology Toulmin ties h~s thought to a
very personalistio, almost individualistic position, and terminologically his thought appears in Lutheran garb.
•

advised to bear firmly in mind Pascal's distinction:

.

We are
we are

neither to take everything literally nor to take everything
•

spiritually, for
it 1s asking for trouble if one ignores the difference between questions of science and ethics,
which are matters of reason, and things like the
existence of God, which are matters of faith • • • •

..
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We might describe the distinction between "faith"
and "reason" in these terms--beiief as a matter of
reason is belief of a proposition of some kind:
belief as _a_ma
__
t-terof faith is belief in a notion
of some kind • • • • The very last question to ask
about God is whether He exists. Rather, we must
first accept the notion of "God": and then we shall
be in a~position to point to evidences of His existence.2, (Toulmin's italics)
-

-

...

•

·Religion calls for "a method of the heart," and in his concluding remarks on the subject, he states:
I have been examining the logical characteristics
of certain types of religious argument: namely,
those which are most intimately related to our
earlier discussions about ethics. This I am entitled to do whatever my personal views about the
importance or unimportance of religion. The propriety of particular arguments within a mode of
reasoning as a whole is another. And while a discussion of the first can properly appear in a book
of logic, one's views on the second would be out
of place, and belong rat~er in an autobiography.i 8
No doubt to the well-trained theological eye these utter-·
ances do not seem sufficiently clear; they will appear Delphic,
ambiguous, small.

But that 1s all we have so far from Mr.

Toulmin, and if one considers the fact that he does not profess to be a theologian, it may seem to be more than it really
is •

...

CHAPTER IV
•

TOULMIN'S KINSHIP WITH WITTGENSTEIN AND RYLE
a

It,1s now time to build a few tentative bridges--philosophical and theological ones.

The philosophical bridges will

not be as tentative as the theological ones, for as far as I
have been able to determine, only one prominent theologian,

Schubert M. Ogden, deals at all explicitly with the thought of
Stephen Toulmin.

But many theologians (or philosophers of

religion, depending on how one proposes to slice up the theological task) are coming to base a great deal of their theologies
on philosophical analyses very similar to those of Mr. Toulmin,
and I would briefly like to sketch the nature of their philo-

sophical kinship with Toulmin before I press on to the theologians.
Toulmin many times throughout his writings acknowledges
his .d ebt to especially two philosophers: Ludwig Wittgenstein
and Gilbert Ryle. 1 Wittgenstein's Philosphical Invest1gations2
and Ryle's The Concept of MindJ are the seminal works in the
philosophical movement commonly referred to as that of ordinary
language, in the ranks of which movement Toulmin 1s commonly
•

placed •
It 1s not difficult to find parallels in their thought.

•

Compare two often quoted passages from Wittgenstein's Investigations with a seminal passage from Ethics.

Wittgenstein:

Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a
maze of little streets·and squares, of old and new
houses, and of houses with additions from various
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•

'l

periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new
borough! with straight regular streets and uniform
houses • • • • Every sign bz itself seems dead. What
gives it life?--In use it is alive. Is life breathed
into it there?--Or is the use its 11fe?5
Toulmin:
Speech is no single-purpose tool. It 1s, in fact,
more like a Boy Scout's knife (an implement with
two kinds of blade, a screw-driver, a corkscrew, a
tin-and-bottle opener, a file, an awl, and even a
thing for taking stones out of horses• hooves);
and, further, it is one which we continually shape
and modify, adding new devices (modes of reasoning:
and types of concept) to perform new functions, and
grinding old ones afresh, in the light of experience,
so that they shall serie their old, familiar; welltried purposes better.
.
For both men human discourse is basically a functional, fluid
sort of thing, rather than rigid and superstreamlined.
It was Wittgenstein who, in making a complete about-face
from his earlier position, gave the lie to a monolithic picture of language and logic in which all different linguistic
activities were required to match up to one all-embracing
standard of meaning.?

In the place of this view he substituted

an infinite number of "language-games," e.g.:

•

•

Giving orders, and obeying them--Describing the
appearance of an object, or giving its measurements-- • • • Reporting an event--Speoulat1ng about
an event-- • • • Making a joke; telling it--Solving
a problem in practical ar1thmetic--Translat1ng from
one language into ~nother--Asking, thanking, cursing,
greeting, praying.~
Each of these describes a linguistic topography whose character
must be respected for its differences as well as its similarities to other topographies.
Many feel that Wittgenstein and his philosophical colleagues
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are advocating a chaotic pluralism, a segmentalization of man
I

•

into an infinite number of compartments which destroy h1s wholeness and integrity.

Such, in

my

opinion, is not the case. for

to reason so overlooks a seldom-used yet key concept in Wittgenstein's Investigations which I think can be paralleled in
Toulmin's work.
Mr. Dallas M. High. in his book Language, Persons. and
Belief (one of the few thorough-going studies of Wittgenstein's
later thought from a theological perspective) maintains that
Wittgenstein was attempting 1~ his later thought to cure language
of a sickness caused by an over-objectification of linguistic
forms; reductionism; and skepticism.

By the use of the concept

"form ·of life, 11 by inquiring into the use or job that different
kinds of linguistic activities perform, even by his style which
seems more like autobiographical ramblings and reminiscences
than a carefully plotted ph110s9phica1·... lecture, High·-maintains
that Wittgenstein 1s attempting to force philosophy and, indeed,
Western culture to return to a new personalism, to our fundamental roots as complex human:beings.9

All objective language,

all logic and science are based on "person-talk, 11 and "person"

..

· 1s a systematically elusive expression, an historical expression.

t

All talk assumes a speaker and a hearer.

This basic

personalism upon which all language is based 1s the

11

form of

life" at this juncture in Western c1v111zation, 10 and consequently- 1t · ··r eveals the fiduciary basis of all language:
"Doubting has an end" Qhilosophical I.nvestigations,
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pg. 1807 or comes to an end wherein it is dependent
upon something else--someth1ng accepted and trusted
in--which has made even the method of doubt itself
possible. 1 1:: The concept "believing" (also 11 personal
backing," "agreements in judgments, 11 "civil accreditation," and "accepting the given") is indispensable
to all forms of speaking and thinking about the
lforld. By this I am suggesting that the act of 11 believing11 is on the same logical ground with those
concepts which are the bedrock of the function of
language. No human intelligence or speech, however
original or critical, can function outside the conditions of judgment, personal assent, and the fiduciary
modes of human confidence and life. In short, language
(and what counts as 11 kno1-11ng 11 ) depends upon some sort
of "believing," whatsoever form of believing a person
or persons (as a culture) may accept. This is the
11 given," to use Wittgenstein's term, which is never
clearly indentifiable nor demonstrable by means of
formal procedures but which we must and· in fact do
accept and trust uncritically in any given logical
environment. 2
-"Believe that" statements are al'trays depende~t upon "believe
1n11 statements.
Toulm1n, I believe I have shown above, arrives at~ similar
sort of conclusive personalism 1n which belief-talk makes
sense.

All of the exact statements about what to expect which

issue forth from science are grounded in "a general confidence
about the f'uture 111 3 which is the province of religion, of faith.
The •~·belief _-of" propositions of science and ethics are of a
different logical type from the
•

11

belief in11 utterances of

religion, yet nonetheless they are intimately related through
the phenomena of "limiting questions" which we persist in
asking and which issue in very positive, healthy results when
we do ask them. (See pp. 2Jf.)

One finally comes up ag~1nst

Mr. Toulmin's autobiography (pg. 25):

we

find him as a person,

JO
not simply as a scientist nor an ethician nor a philosopher,

!

·quoting Pascal:

•

When I consider the briefness of my life, swallowed
up in the eternity before and behind it, the small
space I fill, or even see, engulfed in the infinite
immensity of spaces which I know not, and which know
not me, I am afraid • • • • Who has set me here? By
whose order and arrange~ent have this place and this
time been allotted me?l~

if

.
The Concept !lf_ Mind attempts to

Similarly, Gilbert Ryle.

red~em human wholeness and personal integrity from the fracturing _effect of Cartesian dualism which still holds sway in
much philosophical (technical as well as untechnical) thinking
today, a dualism expressed now by such dichotomies as body/
mind, believing/knowing, science/religion.

Such dichotomies,

supported even by many theologians, are destructive of human
wholentiss.

Not that we should not clearly distinguish among

_t.h e different jobs that different languages ( 11 categories 11 to
use Ryle's term) do.

Indeed~-

If. the seeming feuds between science and theology
or between fundamental physics a~~ common knowledge
are to b~·dissolved at all, their dissolution can
come nc,t·.:_from making the polite ·compromise that
both parties are really artists of a sort working
from different points of view and with different
sketching materials, but only from drawing unogmprom1s1ng contrasts between-their businesses. 1 ~
But this is _a:c.~omplished without a judgmental reductionism,
I

•

•

o

e.g., reducing ethics to psychology, scientific inquiry to
formal logic, musicology to physics, but by seeing where each
act1v1ty--1n its own unique way--slots in· ·a;o our common life
as total hiunan beings.
•

I

•

•

,

•

....

\

Instead of jumping to hasty, simplistic
.

. .

.

.

..

: :

..

.

.

..

Jl
dichotomies, we must be prepared to see the following:

'I

•·

The settlement or even partial settlement of a
piece of litigation between theories cannot be
achieved by any one stereotyped manoeuvre. There
1s no one regulation move or sequence of moves as
a result of which the correct logical bearings
between the disputing positions can be fixed.16
Underlying all our various philosophical peregrinations, Ryle
reminds us, is the same kind of personalism that was encountered
in Wittgenstein and Toulmin:
ghost-ridden machines.

"Men are not machines, not even

They are men--a tautology which 1s

sometimes worth remembering. 1 7
In Toulmin, and to a lesser degree in Ryle, certain developments in the idea of "language-games 11 or, to use a somelrhat more
familiar term,

11

un1verses of d_iscourse 11 have taken place.

Where Wittgenstein left the idea, it referred to a great complex of things (see pg~-·~27).

Now it has come to be equated

with different disciplines or "fields," such as science,
sciences, ethics, theology.

Yet the lines of argument remain

more or less intact among all three thinkers.

(Toulmin's

special appeal for Americans, it seems to me 1 1s that he deals
_most explicitly ·w1 th scientific concepts, wher-~ as :W:1. ttgenste,.n-..and· Ryle _do. ·s-o:. more ··obliquely.)

CHAPTER V
SOME THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS

•

•

Most, though by no means all, of the above has contributed
to a justification of theology--wh1ch 1s all the more ama~1ng
because it does not come from theological circles--while only
some of the philosophers• argumentation deals with the substance
of theology.

I then remains to be seen what a few theologians

can do and have done with this philosophical approach to
theology; how it has affected their answers to uniquely theological questions (methodology, salvation, grace, etc.) which
can be dealt with only by theologians.

Most of the theologians

surveyed by this writer tend.to tie the foregoing philosophical
position to other philosophical and theological postures;
strong.synoptic, synthetic attempts are being made to tie
together several of the loose theological threads to be found
on both sides of the English Channel and the Atlantic Ocean.
Schubert M. Ogden 1s representati~e of this synoptic te~dency, and because he is the only theologian known to this
writer who bases a major work directly on the work of Mr. Toulmin,
I would like to dwell on him as some length.

Ogd~n. a former

pupil of Rudolf Bultmann and author of a widely read study of
his teacher entitled Christ Without Myth, bases his The Bealitz
of God on Toulmin's analysis of the theological task. 1 According
to Ogden, theology on both sides of the Atlantic has reached
a crisis at the center of which 1s situated the problem of ~od:

the demythologizing program of Bultmann and the death -of God
program both testify to the difficulty theologians are having
•

•

in speaking meaningfully about God.

The dangers of super-

naturalism are clearly discerned (the dan~ers of a God unrelated
to the lrorld), but no clear, compelling alternative has been
suggested to describe the divine presence:

theologians wish

to affirm the joys of secularity along with the reality of G.o d,
but lack the systematic power to do so without lapsing into
gibberish or irrelevancy.

•

Ogden expresses the conviction:

The only way any conception of God can be made more
than a mere idea having nothing to do with reality
1s to exhibit·. it as the most adequate reflective
account we can give of certain experiences in which
we all inescapably share. This, too, it seems to
me, is a conclusion that forces itself upon-:lis out
of our modern situation. We have slowly le~rned
through our actual hist.c ry that no assertions ·a re
to be judged true, unless, in addition to being
logically consistent, they are somehow warranted
by our common experience, broadly and fairly understood. But one thing, it would appear, in which
almost all of us today share 1s just our experience
as modern, secular men: our affirmation of life
here and now 1n the world in all its aspects and
in its proper autonomy and significance. My·.conviction is that it is in this secular affirmation
that we must discover the reality of God in our
time. The adequate response to secularistic nega·t1ons will not be made by a supernaturalism that
is no longer tenable or by a naturalism that uncritically accepts the same negations. It will be
made, rather, by an integral secularity--a secularity
which has become fully self-conscious and which
therefore makes explicit the faith 1n God already
implied in what it itself affirms. 2
This middle road of an integral secularity which is to
be walked between supernaturalism and naturalism is the road
of faith:

not a faith unrelated to the world, as implied 1n
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the antinomies faith/reason, belief/logic, or nature/grace
(see pg. JO above).

Rather, religious faith 1s an expression

"at the level of self-conscious belief 11 J of the faith upon
I

which all the endeavors and the autonomy of the secular world
is based.

This is the kind of faith to which Toulmin refers

in his analysis of the religious situation:

the faith that

is at the foundation of science and ethics; that does not contradict them but rather supports them through the phenomena of
"limiting questions."
For Ogden then:
The primary use or function of 11 God 11 :·~_is to refer to
the objective ground _ _J:!! reality itself of our ineradicable confidence in the final worth of our existence.
It lies in the nature of tnis basic cont1aence to affirm that the real whole of which we experience ourselves to be parts is such as to be worthy of, and
thus itself to evoke, that very confidence. 4 (my
italics)
To deny the existence of God, then, is to deny existence as
such.

Those who propose nontheistic moral theories are

deficiently humanistic because they fail to take account of
the

11

bas1c confidence in the abiding worth of our 11fe 0 5 which

theism, and especially Christianity, affirms, and those who
outright deny the ·e xistence of God are involving themselves
in "nothing less than
contradiction.116

ffin.7

outright antinomy or self-

Such responses to living are s1n.7

Ogden concurs with Toulmin that religion 1s the realm of
the eminently personal and maintains that of all philosophical
positions existentialism has provided the most acute analysis

JS
of what it means to be a person.

If theology is not to en-

croach upon the object language and realm of science, this
i

•

must not be seen as a reproach but as an invitation to cultivate its own realm, the realm of the personal, more zealously •
The older ontologies of the scholastics made the fatal mistake .
of using object-language to describe God, but 1n.-:Martin
Heidegger Ogden sees an ontology really relevant to the theological task:
Because Heidegger's basic ontological orientation is
not to the world of ordinary perception fE'he world
of objects and sc1ence7, but to the more primal
phenomenon of human existence, f1n1tude 1s seen by
him to consist not in temporality and relatedness
as such, but in the limited mode of these perfections appropriate to our own being as men. In
their truly primal forms, temporality and relational
structure are constitutive of being itself, and
God's ·uniqueness 1s to be construed not simply by
denying them, but by conceiving them in their
infinite mode through the negation of their limitat1ons as we experience them in ourselves. 8

-

That scientific and religious statements look alike should not
deceive the reader of theology, warns Ogden, for objectlanguage and person-language will lead one to different, farranging consequences.

On the subject of verification, for

example. Ogden states:
If a theological or metaphysfcal assertion is false,
this is not because it fails in predicting what is
disclosed by our particular external perceptions,
but because it misrepresents the common structure
of all our experiences , .o f which we are originally
aware internally, and thus 1s falsified by any one
of them we choose to consider.9
But, further, to ignore this distinction between these two
kinds of languages (those of objects and persons) will have

J6
more drastic consequences than simply fouling up our verificatory apparatus:
..,.
I

to make the object-language of science

primary 1s idolatry.
human being.

God made all things, but he became a

And even beyond that, although God 1s surely

active at all times in.a person's life and in the life of Jesus,
nonetheless there are crucial human events that are considered
to be of greater significance than other human events.

It 1s,

therefore, in the birth, death, and resurrection that we see
the key to h1unan :personhood, and on this account the key to the
entire universe. 10
Though it would certainly be crude to lump theologians
indiscriminately together and thereby dismiss their differences,
nonetheless a great deal of affinity does exist among several
important writers dealing with theology and its relationship
to linguistic philosophy. Such thinkers as Frederick Ferri, 11
John Macqtiarrie, 12 James Richmond, 1 3 James Martin, 14 Donald
·Evans, 1 5 and Ian Ramsey16 concur that theology cannot compete
with nor be reduced to other disciplines.

It is in this connec-

tion that Paul M. van Buren's widely read book The Secular
Meaning Et_ the Gospe11 7 comes in for a great d~al of criticism.
!VIacquarrie says of van Buren' s "reduced theology":
Astronomy and chemistry have replaced astrology and
alchemy among modern educated people, and are different pursuits, with quite different aims from
those of the old occult pseudo-sciences. Because
these modern sciences are different, the difference
1s .made clear by g1 ving them different names.. No
one would dream of calling them "reduced astrology"
and "reduced alchemy". whatever these expressions
might mean. If the. ,rord "God" is dead, then obviously ·

J?

•
I

God-talk and theology are dead, and we may as well
replace them with ethics or whatever 1s considered
appropriate. But let us not confuse the issue by
talking about a 11 reduced theology" which 1s no
theology at all. 1 ~
Van Buren•s position, according to Macquarrie and others, 19 both
does away with theology (objections to the contrary notwithstanding) and 1s bad logic, for (as Toulmin might say) it ignores and glosses over important features of the logical geography
of our language.
This does not mean that theology for these thinkers ceases
to be eminently personal, as it is for van Buren and (I hope I
have sholrn) for Toulmin and Ogden.

Evans I talk about 11 depth
experiences" and "I-Thou encounters 11 ; 20 Macquarrie's footing in .
Heid·e gger•s personalistic ontology; 21 Ferr~'s taking the "conceptual model" of theology to be "the creative, self-giving,
personal love of Jesus Christ 11 ; 22 all this points towards concurrence with one of Ramsey's characteristic statements:
Well, does not the way in which distinctively personal s1t.uat1ons parallel those which are oharact·eria.tically religious, suggest close logical kinship
between "I" and 11 God 11 ? Both, by the standards of
observatio~ijl language, are odd in their logical
behaviour. J
Personal, but odd.

Theology is odd because 1t is not .history,

not psychology. not anything else but theology. just as psychology
is nothing else but psychology.
way. for as Ramsey states:

One would not want it any other

"the central problem of theology

1s how to use, how to qualify, observational language so as
to be suitable currency for what in part exceeds it--the

JB
situations in which theology is founded. 11 -24

This task belongs

alone to theology, and such theological talk as that surrounding
I

"sin," "grace," ~~salvation," "the lordship of Jesus Christ 11
cannot be reduced to historical or psychological statements
any more than one oan reduce biology to physics or geography to
mineralogy.
Finally, just as we must keep in mind the "stratification"
and "conceptual scaffolding"

of

the different sciences (see

pg. 8 above) and the reliance of each upon some "paradigm" or
"ideal of natural order•i· (see pg. 6 above), so too with theology.
All theological statements are not of the same logical type~
Richmond sees basically three types of theological statements:
moral, revelat1onal, and historioa1. 25 Macquarrie calls the
"basic logic" of theology the "language of existence and being":
a complex of mythological, symbolic, analogi·c al, paradoxical,
and empirical types of statements, all of which have their
proper ecological niche in our theological vocabularies. 26 And
Ferre,
' in d·1s cussing the

11

manifold logic of theism, 11 sets forth

the "paradigm" for this "conceptual scaffolding":
Theological speech projects a model of immense
responsive significance, drawn from 11 the facts,"
as the key to its conceptual synthesis. This model,
for theism, is made up of the 11 spir1tual 11 characteristics of personality: will, purpose, wisdom,
love, and the like. For Christianity, more specifically, the conceptual model consists in the
creative, self-giving, personal love of Jesus Christ.
In this model is found the only literal meaning
which these terms, like "creative," "personal,"
and "love, 11 can have in the Christian vocabulary.
All the concepts of the Christian are organized
and synthesized in relation to this model. The
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efforts of systematic theology are bent to explicating the consistency and coherence of the synthesis built on this model ·of "God" as key concept.
Christian preaching is devoted to pointing out the ·
applicability of this conceptual synthesis· to common experiences of life. And Christian apologetics
struggles to show that the synthesis organized
around this model is adequate to the unforc·e d 1nterpretai1on of all experience, including suffering and
evil.?.
Unlike other disciplines, the model for Chr1st1an theology
never changes.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

,,
t
.I

The way lies strewn with conclusions, but perhaps I can
summarize them briefly in three ways.

(1)

Natural theology, just like God, 1s not dead.

The

very philosophical tradition (British empiricism) which produced
Hume's destruction of St. Thomas has also now produced Toulmin,
who by analyzing science and other human endeavors on their own

------

terms has arrived at an appreciation of the life and way of faith.
This 1s not to make nature a subjective genitive, but rather
an objective genitive:

we should say theology of nature, perhaps,

rather than natural theology.

Such is more or less the approach
of John B. Cobb in his! Christian Natural Theology1 and also

John Macquarrie, who writes succinctly:
Let it suffice to say that I do not think that one
can prove the reality of God or e~tablish the •truth'
of faith on the basis of empirical arguments. The
evidence is too ambiguous, and furthermore the logi'cal
connections between the premises and the conclusion
are too dubious. But this is not to deny all value
to natural theology. Thoug_h it could not est.a blish
a religious faith, it can support one. The point
is that any ·faith must let itself be exposed to the
observable facts of the world in which we live. The
business of natural theology is to show that these
facts are not incompatible with the convictions of
faith, and may even tend to confirm these convictions. 2
In short, there 1s room in the universe for both science and
theology, and to know this 1s to enhance both our scientific
and theological reflections.
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(2)

Theology, rather than talking the object-language of

the sciences, essentially talks person-language.
1

•
.I

Theology

should not be embarassed by the "systematic elusiveness" of
person-language, for such language remains at the basis of all
object-language.

At our roots we are human beings-, not objects.

(See especially pg. 29 above.)
(J)

Theologians not:.only.:must :tbe .consc1ou~ of the unity

of the theological task--Speaking the word of God's love in
Jesus Christ as clearly and effectively as possible--but they
must also be sensitive to the diversity of the theological task,

to the

11

stratif1oat1on" and "con.c eptual scaffolding" of theology.

The two, after all, go hand in hand· •

..
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